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I. ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Issue: Whether the Haik Parties preemptive affirmative defenses of estoppel, 
waiver or laches as a matter of law divest or transfer title or otherwise bar Sandy from 
asserting ownership of the Water Right.  
Standard of Review:  The trial court dismissed the Haik Parties’ estoppel, waiver 
and laches claims as individual or collective bases for barring Sandy from claiming title 
to the Water Right.  (Cf. R. 4-5, ¶¶ 19-22 and R. 93-94).  Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) 
is a legal question, reviewed in this Court de novo.  Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 
UT 11, ¶14, 203 P.3d 962. 
II. PRESERVATION OF THE CROSS-APPEAL ISSUE 
 Sandy’s motion to dismiss is at R. 17-27.  The Haik Parties opposition is at R. 66-
73.  Sandy’s Reply is at R. 78-84.  The Order dismissing the second claim is R. 93-94. 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-1(3)(relevant part) 
 
“Real property” or “real estate” means any right, title, estate, or interest in 
land . . . and all water rights . . .  
 
IV. FACTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The essential facts concerning the cross-appeal are established by operation of 
law.  On a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the alleged facts are presumed true. Whipple v. 
American Fork Irrig. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996).  The Haik Parties alleged as 
follows: 
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During the 28 years prior to recording of the Sandy Deed, 
Sandy has never asserted ownership of the Water Right but 
has instead taken various actions, including the filing of 
written documents, acknowledging no ownership of the 
Water Right and confirming instead ownership in the 
Plaintiffs’ predecessor in title.   
 
(R. 4 ¶19). 
 
V. FACTS ON MAIN APPEAL 
 
 The Haik Parties’ legal description of the Water Right is but one variation. (Resp. 
Brf. at 3).  The earliest known description is in Sandy’s Quitclaim, and it is repeated in 
one of the deeds relied on by the Haik Parties: 
“1/4 of the .25 CFS, awarded to the South Despain Ditch in 
the Little Cottonwood Decree, Case No. 4802, June 16, 1910 
equalling .0625 CFS as certificated by the Office of the State 
Engineer, Certificate No. A-702, for irrigation, stock-
watering and domestic use, the point of diversion is located 
north 242 ft. E 770 ft. from the W. ¼ Corner, Section 12, 
T3S, R1E, SLB&M” 
 
(R. 278 and R. 197). 
 
 Recognized by decree in 1910, the larger water right from which the Water Right 
is segregated predates the Little Cottonwood Subdivision by sixty-eight years.  (Cf. R. 
278 and R. 257 ¶17).  The Little Cottonwood Subdivision plat was recorded on August 
23, 1978, creating Lot 31.  (R. 212).1 
                                                 
1 The Haik Parties did not dispute paragraphs 1, 3-5, 8-15 and 17 in Sandy’s principal 
summary judgment memorandum in support of its cross-motion.  (Cf. R. 257, ¶¶1, 3-5, 8-
15, 17 and R. 363-65).  This fact is from R. 260 ¶17. 
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 As part of their factual predicate, the Haik Parties continue to use the phrase 
“official public records of the Utah Division of Water Rights” to establish their claim of a 
“complete chain of title.”  (Resp. Brf. at 4).  We explained in our opening brief why the 
phrase incorrectly describes the Division’s function.  The only office of record for title to 
water rights is the county recorder.  UTAH CODE ANN. §73-1-10 (1959) and current §73-
1-10(1)(a)-(c).  Disavowing official imprimatur for recording water right conveyances, 
the Division provides a Title Abstract Sheet for voluntary public use in updating water 
right title.  That form states as follows: 
No agency of the State of Utah warrants or guarantees title to 
certain water rights.  The State Engineer’s Office serves only 
as an office of public record.  The water right information 
provided here reflects that which has been filed with the State 
Engineer’s Office by the public.  If an opinion of title 
assurance is desired, an attorney or other qualified 
professional should be retained. 
 
(R. 421). 
 The Haik Parties contend at page 4 of their statement of facts that,  
[i]n fact, a complete chain of title to the Water Right from 
Howard W. Bentley to the Haik Parties’ immediate 
predecessor in title, Lynn Christensen Biddulph, was 
established by the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder’s 
Office. 
   
For support, they cite to R. 176, and presumably paragraph 2 of their summary 
judgment memorandum.  That paragraph was flatly disputed on multiple grounds.  (R. 
251-53).  It may be accurate to say that the county recorder showed a chain of title to Lot 
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31.  The Haik Parties merely assume that the Water Right was appurtenant to Lot 31 and 
ask this Court to do the same.   
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 The Haik Parties’ argue three essential themes.  They first contend that, although 
they had record notice of the Agreement of Sale, they did not have notice of the Sandy 
Deed or what they call more generally, a “conveyance.”  (Resp. Brf. at 12-13)(“neither 
the Sandy Deed nor any other instrument of conveyance . . . was recorded at the time the 
Haik Parties purchased the Water Right.”)(emphasis added).  This argument fails because 
the Agreement of Sale is an “instrument of conveyance” of a property interest to Sandy. 
 Second, they argue that the Agreement of Sale is executory and that record notice 
of its contents is therefore insufficient because one cannot tell by looking at it whether 
the agreement was actually performed.  (Resp. Brf. at 9-10).2  This argument fails 
because, first, the Agreement is not executory.  Rather, it describes in the clearest 
possible terms a transaction completed on January 13, 1977.  Second, executory or not, 
the agreement transfers equitable title, itself a matter of record notice.    
                                                 
2  The Haik Parties state that “Sandy has been unable to definitively establish that the 
purchase of the Water Right called for in the ‘Agreement of Sale’ was ever completed. . . 
.”  (Resp. Brf. at 3 n.1)(emphasis added).  There are three common evidentiary burdens: 
“preponderance of the evidence,” the standard for most civil cases, Johns v. Shulsen, 717 
P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986), “clear and convincing evidence,” for fraud cases, 
overcoming presumptions and establishing or taking certain property and other rights, 
Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88, ¶13, 978 P.2d 465, 
Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995), and “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” reserved for criminal cases.  State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶16, 210 P.3d 288.  
Sandy doubts the existence of the “definitively establish” standard and in any event 
disputes its applicability here. 
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 The Haik Parties next contend that a “complete chain of title” leading to their 
purchase of Lot 31 established their title.  (See, e.g., Resp. Brf. at 6-7, 24).  In effect, this 
claim asks this Court to beg the central question of record notice by ignoring the 
Agreement of Sale and the Sandy Deed and assuming that the entire Water Right was 
used beneficially on Lot 31, and only Lot 31, from at least 1974 to 1983, when Biddulph 
acquired that ground (R. 194), despite the undisputed facts that Sandy’s Agreement of 
Sale and deed predate Lot 31.  (Cf. R. 278-79 and R. 260 ¶17 (undisputed fact—see R. 
364-65).  The appurtenance argument is further based on inadmissible hearsay, namely a 
letter the Haik Parties substituted for sworn testimony.  Sandy’s motion to exclude was 
determined to be moot.  (R. 432-441, 522).  The trial court accepted the appurtenance 
claim.  (R. 521).3 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. Appurtenance is not relevant to record notice of Sandy’s interest in the 
Water Right. 
 
The trial court’s ruling and the Haik Parties’ argument is infected with the 
fundamentally irrelevant premise that the Water Right was appurtenant to Lot 31.  (R. 
521).  The issue of whether and to what extent the Water Right was appurtenant to Lot 31 
is a side attraction.  It was not litigated below, but merely assumed.  It remains dubious in 
light of the fact that the Haik Parties’ predecessor, Biddulph, acquired the Water Right in 
                                                 
3 The Haik Parties spend considerable energy insisting on what Sandy already 
conceded—that they were not on inquiry notice of the Agreement of Sale or the Sandy 
Deed.  (Cf. Sandy Opening Brief at 13 and Response Brief at 21-24). 
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a separate deed, in 1999, sixteen years after she acquired Lot 31.  (Cf. R. 194, 196), and 
see Resp. Brf. at 10-11).  If she and the Haik Parties relied on appurtenance, then there 
was no reason for a separate deed.   The parties to the 1999 Water Right deed to Biddulph 
were equally infected with record notice of Sandy’s interest. 
If the Haik Parties acquired the Water Right with record notice of Sandy’s interest 
(acquired via the Agreement of Sale six years before Biddulph acquired Lot 31)(Cf. R. 
275-76 and 194), and twenty-two years before Biddulph’s 1999 deed to the Water Right 
(Cf. R. 275-76 and 196), then appurtenance is and always has been irrelevant.  That is to 
say, assuming the highly questionable—that the entire Water Right, decreed at a point of 
diversion within what later became the Little Cottonwood Subdivision, was used 
exclusively on what later became Lot 31—the undisputed conveyance to Sandy by virtue 
of the Agreement of Sale and the properly signed 1977 Sandy Deed stripped the Water 
Right from the land.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(1)(c)(appurtenant water transfers with 
land unless “the grantor . . . convey[ed] the water right in a separate conveyance 
document prior to . . . the execution of the land conveyance document” to the Haik 
Parties’ Lot 31 predecessors.). 
B. The Haik Parties rely on inadmissible hearsay for the appurtenance 
argument. 
 
 The Haik Parties supported the appurtenance claim with sheer repetition and 
inadmissible hearsay.  They relied on a letter from Saunders, a principle of Saunders and 
Sweeney.  Not even bothering to authenticate it, they used it below and here, (Resp. Brf. 
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Appendix 3), like a sworn statement to establish that the entire Water Right was used on 
Lot 31 and thus passed with that ground.  (R. 373-74, 378-80).  They need that claim to 
establish a “[chain of title] to the Water Right.”  (Resp. Brf. at 6-7, 24).  Sandy moved to 
exclude the letter on multiple grounds.  (R. 435-441).  The Haik Parties relied on 
evidence rules 801(d)(1), 803(8), 803(5) and 803(15).     
1. The Saunders letter functioned as an unsworn and therefore 
inadmissible affidavit. 
 
 Summary judgment may be opposed with “depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits” demonstrating “a genuine issue for trial.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e).  
The Saunders letter was used “to demonstrate that a disputed issue of fact exists in this 
case precluding summary judgment in favor of Sandy.”  (R. 457).  Admissible testimony 
requires an oath.  UTAH R. EVID. 603.  Saunders’ letter contains none.     
2. Rule 801(d)(1) does not apply. 
 A witnesses’ prior statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at the trial 
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement 
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten . . . .”  UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(1).  The rule does not apply 
because Saunders neither forgot nor repudiated the substance of the letter.  He testified 
that he forgot the details of the transaction with Sandy—a transaction he did not deny but 
did not mention in the letter.  (R. 378-80; 276, 353 (depo. pp. 45-46)).  Whether Saunders 
recalled the Agreement of Sale or the Sandy Deed (both of which he admitted signing) is 
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irrelevant to whether record notice defeats the Haik Parties’ claim and irrelevant to 
whether the letter is admissible.  Saunders recalled the letter’s contents.  It cannot, 
therefore, be used a “prior statement” of events he could not recall despite the letter, 
namely the transaction with Sandy.    
3 .  The Saunders letter is not a public record within the meaning of Rule 
803(8). 
 
 Rule 803(8) public records are those made by a public office or agency concerning 
activities or observations it is duty-bound to make, not merely documents deposited with 
it.  The rule permits “[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations . . . of public 
offices or agencies” that contain “the activities of the office or agency, or “matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law . . . .”  The Saunders letter is none of these. 
 4 . Exception 803(5) does not apply. 
 Rule 803(5) permits hearsay in the form of a record of a matter the witness once 
knew but cannot later recall.  The Haik Parties argued below that because Saunders could 
not recall “details” concerning the Agreement of Sale and Sandy Deed, the letter is 
admissible to explain—not those events, which the letter does not discuss and which he 
could not recall—but a later transfer to their Lot 31 predecessor.  (R. 461).  This too is a 
non sequitur.  Merely because Saunders wrote a letter about one deed and could not recall 
its “details,” does not also mean that the letter is admissible concerning the entirely 
separate Sandy Deed and the apparently forgotten Sandy transaction. 
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 5. Exception 803(15) does not apply. 
 Reaching further, the Haik Parties argued that the Saunders letter establishes or 
affects an interest in property because it was provided to the Division “to update title to 
the Water Right.”  (R. 462).  Under §73-1-10(1)(a)-(c), only the county recorder is the 
office of record for title to water rights.  Updating the Division, though wise but not 
required, includes “a report of water right conveyance. . . .”  Id. §(3)(a).  That report 
“update[s] water right ownership on the records of the state engineer.”  Id.  It does not 
affect ownership.  Cf., e.g., MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE, at 639 (2007-08 
ed.)(comparing Federal Advisory Committee Note, that Rule 803(15) covers recitals in 
“dispositive documents” such as deeds). 
 Accordingly, the Division does not record or effect conveyances.  Plainly its 
public records are “update[d]” based only on what buyers and sellers send it, if they send 
anything at all.  (See R. 421).  The Saunders letter, which is neither a deed nor other 
instrument affecting real property, does not become such merely because it was delivered 
to the Division. 
C. The Haik Parties purchased with record notice of Sandy’s interest in the 
Water Right. 
 
Our opening brief describes the reach and importance of record notice.  The Haik 
Parties resort to looking for cracks.  They grudgingly acknowledge the Agreement of 
Sale’s contents but contend they had no record notice of a “conveyance” or of the Sandy 
Deed.  (Resp. Brf. at 8, 12-13).  Similarly, using an executory contract theory, they argue 
 
458051v1  -10-
that it is impossible to know by reading it whether the Agreement of Sale was actually 
performed.  (Resp. Brf. at 9-10).  Record notice, however, is not limited to a 
“conveyance” (as the Haik Parties improperly define it). Neither does it depend on 
outcome.  It is fixed at the moment of recording.  Wilson v. Schneiter’s Riverside Golf 
Course, 523 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1974), quoting §57-3-2 (notice imparted “from the 
time of filing the same with the recorder”).  If by the term “conveyance” the Haik Parties 
mean that only a deed imparts record notice, then they could not be more wrong.  All 
“documents” within the meaning of §57-1-1(2), including a “conveyance,” impart record 
notice.   
The purpose of a lis pendens illustrates.  Persons dealing with real property that is 
the subject of litigation are on record notice upon the recording of a lis pendens.4  A lis 
pendens “serves as a warning to all persons that any rights or interests they may acquire 
in the interim are subject to the judgment or decree” in pending litigation.  Bagnall v. 
Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978).  The result of that litigation, likely 
not yet determined when the lis pendens is recorded, nevertheless binds anyone dealing 
with the subject property.  See also Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 1996).  
The law does not await the outcome of the litigation before a determination of record 
notice is made.  Neither is record notice suspended until a person gains actual knowledge 
                                                 
4  A lis pendens must be recorded in a partition action, UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-6-
1204(1), and may be recorded in any action concerning real property.  Id. at §78B-6-
1303.  
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of a recorded instrument (a deed, a mortgage, a mechanics’ lien) and determines that the 
instrument was performed according to its terms. 
Legal knowledge of the interest, in the case of an agreement, or the potential 
interest(s), in the case of a lis pendens, whatever those interests are or turn out to be, is 
imparted upon recording.  State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶19, 44 P.3d 680, quoting 
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-3-101.  That is both the result of recording, a conclusive 
presumption the Haik Parties cannot avoid, and it is also why we record.  Capital Assets 
Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201, 206 (Utah 2000)(policies underlying recording act 
are “intended to impede fraud, to foster the alienability of real property, and to provide 
for predictability and integrity in real estate transactions.”).  While it is not clear under 
Utah law whether the Agreement of Sale’s reference to the Sandy Deed constitutes record 
notice of the deed’s contents, there was plainly record notice of the deed’s existence and 
delivery because the Agreement plainly describes both.  (R. 278-79, ¶¶1,5)(payment, 
execution and delivery of deed occurred simultaneously on January 13, 1977).  Cf. 
Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n., 2002 UT App 332, ¶24,  57 P.3d 
1119(recorded CC&R’s imparted record notice of statute “by incorporation”).5   
                                                 
5 In some states, recorded documents impart notice of other documents they reference.  
See, e.g., Deljoo v. SunTrust Mortgage, 668 S.E.2d 245 (Ga. 2008); Powers v. Olson, 742 
A.2d 799 (Conn. 2000); Urquhart v. Teller, 958 P.2d 714 (Mont. 1998).  South Carolina 
appears to have gone even further.  There, the duty to exercise due diligence in a real 
property transaction is sufficient to trigger inquiry notice.  Spence v. Spence., 628 S.E.2d 
869, 876 (S.C. 2006)(“[a] party is bound to the exercise of due diligence, and is assumed 
to have the knowledge to which that diligence would lead him”). 
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D. Sandy argued and thereby preserved equitable conversion. 
 
 The Haik Parties contend that Sandy did not preserve its “equitable conversion” 
argument.  (Resp. Brf. at 20).  Appellate preservation requires that an issue be first raised 
in the trial court, “giving that court an opportunity to rule . . . .”  Searle v. Searle, 2001 
UT App 367, ¶17, 38 P.3d 307(internal quotation marks omitted).  An issue is 
sufficiently raised when it is brought “to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge 
can consider it.”  LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 
1991)(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Under the heading “Constructive notice of Sandy’s claim was imparted due to the 
nature of the recorded Agreement[,]” Sandy argued the elements of equitable conversion 
in reply to the Haik Parties’ claim that the Agreement was merely “executory”:   
Recording an agreement for the sale of real property imparts 
the same notice imparted by a deed.  What plaintiffs miss is 
the legal effect of agreements for the sale of real property.  
“The interest of a purchaser under a real estate contract is an 
interest in real property . . . .”  Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 
P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1982). 
     
“An earnest money agreement is a legally binding executory 
contract for the sale of real property.”  Lach v. Deseret Bank, 
746 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah App. 1987), citing et al. Eliason v. 
Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1980).  The seller’s interest 
converts to “personalty.”  Lach, 746 P.2d at 805, quoting 
Willson v. State Tax Commission, 499 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Utah 
1972).  The buyer in turn “acquires the equitable interest in 
the property at the moment the contract is created and is 
thereafter treated as the owner of the land.”  Lach, 746 P.2d at 
805.  See Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court, 511 P.2d 
739, 741 (Utah 1973). 
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(R. 448-49). 
 
 Sandy did not use the term “equitable conversion” in its memorandum, but the 
argument is there, and the cited authorities use the term.  “Equitable conversion” is 
merely a name for circumstances that result in a legal conclusion—the conversion of a 
seller’s interest from realty to “personalty” and the buyer’s acquisition of equitable title.  
Cf. R. 448-49 and Lach, 746 P.2d at 805.   
 Furthermore, citing (but misspelling) Lach v. Deseret Bank, counsel repeated the 
argument at the hearing, using the talismanic phrase the Haik Parties require: 
And the language [of the Agreement of Sale] plainly 
describes a contemporaneous transfer of consideration, 
payments, whatever that was, in exchange for a deed effective 
upon execution, paid upon execution and recorded the next 
day at the request of the grantor, by the way, which I think 
you can draw a pretty important inference from that.  If 
you’re the person giving up the property described in the 
contract, I don’t think you’re going to rush off to the 
Recorder’s Office the next day unless you’ve got a done deal 
and record that agreement.  Saunders and Sweeney recorded 
this thing, it was recorded at their request. 
 
. . .  That’s why the argument is wrong.  It’s irrelevant 
because when we are talking about the conveyance or the 
transfer of real property, a – it’s the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, and I address this in my response brief.  It’s when 
parties come together to – with a written agreement for the 
transfer of real property, upon execution, when the deal is 
done, the grantor retains only a personal property interest in 
that property right, equitable title for the grantee – the grantee 
is treated as the owner from that point forward.  I think that is 
the Lech, L-e-c-h, Case described – or cited in my 
memorandum. 
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. . . 
  
So it doesn’t help them to say, “Well, maybe the contract is 
merely executory,[”] the equitable title passed the moment 
that agreement was signed.[] 
 
(R. 571 at 23-24)(emphasis added). 
 Sandy argued equitable conversion, and it is sufficient to carry the day, both to 
reverse summary judgment and to quiet Sandy’s title.  Under the Agreement of Sale, 
Sandy acquired “the equitable interest in the property at the moment the contract [was] 
created and is thereafter treated as the owner . . . .”  Lach, 746 P.2d at 805 (citations 
omitted).  The Haik Parties knew of Sandy’s interest as a matter of law the moment they 
began dealing with the Water Right.  Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Beryl Baptist Church, 642 
P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982)(“The basic purpose of the recording laws is to give notice to 
third-party purchasers of real property.”) 
In the same vein, the Haik Parties distinguish Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. 
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), on the grounds that the “recorded contract 
in question itself created a covenant . . . that ran with the land and did not involve 
constructive notice of an unrecorded deed or other instrument of conveyance.”  (Resp. 
Brf. at 19, citing 776 P.2d at 629).  They are only half right, but not in the way they 
intend.  The agreement in Flying Diamond created the covenant, the terms of which were 
binding on later parties due to record notice.  Flying Diamond’s rationale explains why 
the Agreement of Sale imparted record notice of Sandy’s interest.  Like the agreement in 
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Flying Diamond, the Agreement of Sale creates Sandy’s interest in the Water Right by 
conveying equitable title.  See, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1253-54 (Utah 
1987)(under equitable conversion, vendee’s equitable interest in an installment land sale 
contract is real property for purposes of § 78-22-1).       
 E. The Haik Parties incorrectly interpret the Agreement of Sale.   
The Haik Parties are perplexed by the plain terms of the Agreement of Sale and 
transfixed by the term “payments.”  They contend that no consideration beyond 
“payments” is explicitly cited.  Yet they are certain that “payments” must mean money.  
They also dispute delivery of the Sandy Deed.   
A contract is “a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange and a consideration.”  Aquagen Int’l., Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 
(Utah 1998)(revised opinion), quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §17(1) 
(1981). Sufficient consideration “requires that ‘a performance or a return promise must 
be bargained for.’” Aquagen, 972 P.2d at 413, quoting RESTATEMENT at §71 and citing 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co. Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 
(Utah 1985)(“Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange for 
a promise. . . . For the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to constitute 
the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on both parties.”).  This 
Court “consider[s] each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view 
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.”  Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 
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LLC, 2009 UT 27, ¶25, 207 P.3d 1235 (second omission in original)(internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
In Aquagen, reading unambiguous contract terms, this Court noted that one party 
“promised to pay $250,000 in exchange for [an] assignment . . . and [a] promise not to 
compete.  In this bargained-for exchange, an enforceable contract was obviously 
created.”  Aquagen, 972 P.2d at 413-14.  Aquagen’s straightforward analysis was based 
on the plain terms of the writing, contrary to the Haik Parties’ unusual theory of contract 
interpretation, which apparently cannot be done with any degree of accuracy until the 
exchange is confirmed . . . “definitively.”  (Resp. Brf. at 3, n.1).  As the Haik Parties 
would have it, no exchange of promises is on its face enforceable as such, or can even be 
interpreted as such.  Rather, contract interpretation or enforceability is suspended until 
confirmation that consideration actually changed hands.6 
Without a hint of irony, the Haik Parties concede that they “had constructive 
notice of an exchange of promises, or an executory contract . . . .”  (Resp. Brf. at 14).  
That undisputed fact at the very least seals record notice of Sandy’s equitable title.  Lach, 
746 P.2d at 805.  The Agreement of Sale recites the exchange of consideration and states 
that “payments” for the Water Right will be made upon execution, which happened on 
                                                 
6 Consideration is likely the easiest of a contract’s elements.  “[A]s a general rule it is 
settled that any detriment no matter how economically inadequate will support a 
promise.”  DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah App. 1988), quoting  J. 
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 55 at 107 (1970), and citing Gasser v. Horne, 
557 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976)(“It has further been held that there is consideration 
whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where promisee suffers a detriment, however 
slight.”). 
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January 13, 1977, when “the deed” was delivered to Sandy.  (R. 278-79, ¶¶1, 5).7    Under 
the Haik Parties’ theory, not even a properly executed and recorded deed imparts record 
notice because, even though presumptively delivered,8 it is impossible to tell 
(“definitively”) by looking at it whether it was actually delivered, or whether the 
consideration it recites (often mere boilerplate: “ten dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration,” see Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d 405, 407 (Utah 1978)) was actually paid.   
 F. The trial court properly dismissed the Haik Parties’ second claim. 
 
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) assumes the truth of the alleged facts but denies 
any right to relief based on them.  Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 
1995).  Dismissal is appropriate if what is pled does not support a proper claim and 
cannot do so “under any state of facts” that could be proved to support the claim.  
Educators Mutual Ins. Ass’n. v. Allied Prop. & Cas., 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995). 
                                                 
7  The Agreement of Sale is integrated.  In Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 
20, ¶12, 182 P.3d 326, this Court defined an integrated agreement as “’a writing or 
writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.’” Id.  
quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 
1995)(citations omitted).  An agreement is integrated if the parties adopt the writing “as 
the final and complete expression of their bargain.”  Id. quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972).  Tangren  explains “that when parties have 
reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, it will be 
conclusively presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the writing contains the whole of the 
agreement between the parties.”  2008 UT 20 at ¶12.  The plain terms of the Agreement 
of Sale leave nothing out.  They describe a complete, and completed, transaction as of 
January 13, 1977.    
8  Recording a deed creates a presumption of delivery.  Kresser v. Peterson, 675 P.2d 
1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). 
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The Haik Parties alleged the following facts to support theories of waiver, estoppel 
and laches: 
During the 28 years prior to recording of the Sandy Deed, 
Sandy has never asserted ownership of the Water Right but 
has instead taken various actions, including the filing of 
written documents, acknowledging no ownership of the 
Water Right and confirming instead ownership in the 
Plaintiffs’ predecessor in title.   
 
(R. 4 ¶19).  According to the Haik Parties, Sandy is “estopped” by these facts “from 
claiming or owning” the Water Right, and has “waived any ownership of or interest in the 
Water Right” or is “barred by . . . laches from asserting any ownership.”  (R. at 4, ¶¶ 20-
22)(emphasis added).   
Waiver “is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.”  CCD, L.C. v. 
Millsap, 2005 UT 42, ¶34, 116 P.3d 366.  Nutshelled, the elements of estoppel are a 
statement or conduct, “inconsistent with” a later claim, that induces a response and 
resulting reliance-based injury.  Ceco Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 
969-70 (Utah 1989)(citations omitted).  A “negative equitable remedy,” laches is “closely 
related . . . with estoppel . . . .”  Pettersen v. Ogden City, 176 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 1947), 
quoting 2 LAWRENCE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1121.  Laches “deprives” one of a 
“right or remedy” “because his delay in seeking it has operated to the prejudice of 
another.”  Id. 
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1. The Haik Parties’ second claim was never more than an affirmative 
defense to an anticipated counterclaim. 
 
 The Haik Parties conceded the central point that their theories of waiver, estoppel 
and laches were not claims for affirmative relief at all, as claims in a complaint must be, 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a).  The theories were “a bar against [Sandy’s] competing claim to 
title.”  (R. 69).  Thus explained, the theories were never intended as cognizable claims for 
relief.  They were and are affirmative defenses.  UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c).  Moreover, having 
been “mistakenly designated” as claims, the best the trial court could do was “treat the 
pleadings as if there had been a proper designation,” UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c).  The claim 
would have been treated as an affirmative defense to Sandy’s counterclaim, which 
treatment was ultimately unnecessary because they were re-pled in response to the 
counterclaim.  (R. 62-“Fifth Defense”).    
 2. Waiver, estoppel and laches are not defenses to Sandy’s quiet title 
claim.  
 
 “When a person has become the legal owner of real estate he cannot transfer it or 
part with title, except in some of the forms prescribed by law.”  Julian v. Petersen, 966 
P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1998)(quoted cite omitted), citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-1.  
Cf. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997)(“Merely meeting the 
judicially created requirements of boundary by acquiescence does not create legal 
ownership. Absent a voluntary agreement between the disputing parties, a quiet title 
action is the only legally binding way to settle a boundary dispute.”)(emphasis added). 
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See also Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 918 (Utah 1928)(“acquiescence alone will not 
operate as a conveyance. Land cannot be conveyed from one person to another by merely 
a change in possession . . . .”). 
 Title must reside somewhere.  The mere passage of time neither destroys title nor 
bars an owner from asserting it.  See Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 
2004 UT 23, ¶¶13, 17, 89 P.3d 155.  Metro West stands at least for that.  Title to the 
Water Right is not the Water Right itself, nor even the use of it.  Title is ownership, the 
legally protected right to control the property, regardless of whether that control is 
exercised.  See, e.g., Pacific Am. Constr. v. Security Union Title, 987 P.2d 45 (Utah 
1999)(title policy indemnifies against loss due to a defect in the title, not against loss due 
to diminution or change in value of the underlying property);  Haw River Land & Timber 
v. Lawyer’s Title, 152 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 1998)(“[t]itle refers to the legal ownership of a 
property interest so that one having title to a property interest can withstand the assertion 
of others claiming a right to that ownership.”)   
 Accordingly, a property owner might publicly disclaim title, and others might 
occupy and improve the property in reliance.  But until title is transferred or divested in 
some lawful fashion, only possession is surrendered.  The actions of others, even if 
induced by the owner, do not affect title.  Someone who forgets they own property does 
not by virtue of age or bad memory lose title or the right to assert it.  See, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 25-5-1(“[n]o estate or interest in real property . . .nor any trust or power 
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over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or 
by deed or conveyance in writing . . . .”(emphasis added).9    
 Sandy possessed a signed, presumptively delivered deed, which on its face is a 
conveyance. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-13 (properly executed quitclaim is a 
“conveyance”); Chamberlain v. Larsen, 29 P.2d 355, 362 (Utah 1934)(possession of deed 
creates a presumption of delivery).  The Haik Parties speculate about why the Sandy 
Deed was not recorded.  The failure to record neither aids their claim nor affects the 
validity of the conveyance that deed reflects.  Even if Sandy’s conduct caused the Haik 
Parties to believe they owned the Water Right, that in no way bars Sandy from asserting 
and establishing its title.  Sandy must do so on the strength of its own claim, of course.  
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, ¶20, 5 P.3d 1206.  The Haik 
Parties’ defense theories were never more than substitutes for that same burden.   
                                                 
9 Under UTAH CODE ANN. §78B-2-209, for example, a person without legal title is 
deemed “to have been under and in subordination to” the legal title owner unless that 
person has adversely possessed the property.  See  Metro West, 2004 UT 23, ¶¶22-23, 89 
P.3d 155.  In other words, even if possession has changed hands in an adverse possession 
claim, title remains in the first owner until ruled on by the court.  Id.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 A. The Haik Parties purchased the Water Right with unambiguous record 
notice of Sandy’s interest, defeating their claim to good faith protection 
under §73-1-12. 
 
 This first conclusion is a matter of law.  The Agreement of Sale is a “document” 
that by definition imparts notice of its contents—Sandy’s equitable title.  The Haik 
parties were deemed to know that fact just as if they had actually read the Agreement.  
They are not, therefore, protected by §73-1-12.   
   B. Based on the undisputed facts, Sandy’s title should be quieted. 
 The Haik Parties can, and do, only speculate about why the Sandy Deed was not 
recorded at the same time as the Agreement of Sale by relying mostly on the memory of 
someone (Saunders) who cannot recall.  The presumptions of a conveyance and delivery, 
along with the undisputed surrounding circumstances of Sandy’s possession of the 
original deed, including where it was kept and how it was found, establish Sandy’s title.  
The Haik Parties’ appurtenance argument is mere cover, but never reached due to (1) the 
presumptive conveyance to Sandy and (2) record notice of Sandy’s undisputed interest. 
 Accordingly, the Court should reverse the summary judgment and remand for 
entry of judgment quieting Sandy’s title.10  
                                                 
10  Below, Sandy established certain facts surrounding the recording of the Agreement of 
Sale. Specifically, Sandy explained the circumstances of its conveyance to Saunders and 
Sweeney of 4.1 acres adjacent to the land that later became the Little Cottonwood 
Subdivision.  (R. 257 ¶1, 258 ¶¶3-5).  That 4.1 acres was declared surplus and was 
designated for sale to Saunders.  (R. 363).  A preliminary title report for that ground, a 
copy of the deed for the 4.1 acres to Saunders and Sweeney and other documents were 
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kept in the same file as the original Sandy Deed and the Agreement of Sale.  (R. 258-59, 
¶¶ 8-15).  Our belief was and is that the 4.1 acres was the consideration paid for the 
Water Right. Saunders and Sweeney, which conveyed the Water Right to Sandy upon 
signing the Sandy Deed, unquestionably received the 4.1 acres and recorded their deed at 
the same time as they recorded the Agreement of Sale.  (R. 259 ¶¶9-10).  Saunders and 
Sweeney later sold a portion of the 4.1 acres.  (R. 259, ¶15).  We did not, as the Haik 
Parties suggest, abandon that theory.  The facts were provided below because the 
inference is reasonable, but it is not necessary to establish Sandy’s title.     
 
458051v1  -24-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I certify that on February ____ 2010, two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant were delivered to the following by: 
 
[  ]  Hand Delivery 
 
[  ]  Facsimile 
 
[X]  U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
 
[  ]  Federal Express 
 
[  ]  Certified Mail, Receipt No. ____, return receipt requested 
 
[  ]  Email/Electronic Delivery  
 
Ronald G. Russell 
Parr, Waddoups, et al. 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City,  UT  84147 
Attorneys for Appellees, Haik, et al. 
 
Kevin D. Tolton 
1454 Skyline Drive 
Bountiful, UT  84010 
Pro se 
 
John S. Flitton 
Attorney at Law 
1840 Sun Peak Drive, Suite B102 
Park City, UT 84098 
Attorney for Lynn Biddulph 
 
Judith Maack 
3992 South 2280 East 
Holliday, UT 84124 
Pro se 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
458051v1  -38-
 
 
 
 
ADDENDUM 
 
 
Letter of December 18, 1998 (R. 378-80) 
